Abstract-An essential, but nevertheless often neglected, objective for the design of safety-critical IEEE 802.11p-based application is: fail-safety. A fail-safe application is an application that incorporates features that automatically counteract the effect of anticipated sources of failure. In the context of a rear-end collision avoidance application two main possible sources of failure exist: an unpredictable human behavior and unreliable communication. This paper presents mechanisms that, when integrated into the design of rear-end collision avoidance application, counteract these failure cases and thus ensure fail-safety. However, failsafety comes at a cost: either large inter-vehicle distances have to be kept to ensure that all drivers have enough time to react or the application has to take over vehicle control to allow smaller inter-vehicle distances and thus higher traffic efficiency. In this paper we analyze this tradeoff and quantify what part of drivers' population has to be deprived of vehicle control in order to achieve acceptable traffic efficiency when deploying IEEE 802.11p-based rear-end collision avoidance application.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main motivation behind vehicular communication research is to explore the possibility of IEEE 802.11p communication to contribute to safer and more efficient road traffic. Various applications are envisioned to assist the driver in different traffic situations, e.g., on intersection crossing [8] or in the traffic flow [4] . Applications are anticipated to notify the driver, e.g., as in forward collision warning or even take over the vehicle control, e.g., as in rear-end collision avoidance. While IEEE 802.11p communication has been extensively researched, it is still not clear to which extent communication can support particular applications in certain road traffic situations. In order to evaluate communication feasibility to support particular IEEE 802.11p-based application, application's logic has to be carefully and clearly designed. Meanwhile, the research focus has only recently started to move towards application design [7] , [4] and [13] . The most important design feature for virtually any system, but especially for safetycritical applications is fail-safety. A fail-safe application is an application "that incorporates features for automatically counteracting the effect of an anticipated possible source of failure"
1 . The design of driver assistance applications has to not only pursue a fail-safe objective, but also result in reasonable traffic efficiency. Traffic safety and traffic efficiency sometimes have contradicting requirements. Traffic that is safe potentially is not very efficient, since in order to achieve safety, vehicles need to e.g., increase inter-vehicle distance. On the other hand, efficient traffic implies high speeds and small intervehicle distance, and thus, a possibility for unsafe situations. 1 Definition from Merriam-Webster dictionary Driver assistance applications that are based on in-vehicle sensors, like cameras or radars, are being also researched and designed e.g., [14] , and even standardized, e.g., ISO 15623 [5] . In-vehicle sensors have their limitations, e.g., sensitivity to weather conditions [6] and to interference [11] . Furthermore, many of these sensor-based applications rely on the driver to take actions, which makes the effectiveness of these systems highly dependent on the adequate response of the drivers. Their fail-safety feature thus, consists of informing the driver that system is unable to provide reliable services. While recent tendencies move towards automated driving, it becomes possible to extend fail-safe features beyond reliance on the driver. In this context, the intention is not to substitute sensorbased applications, but to explore new opportunities enabled by communication and potential synergy approaches [6] .
In this paper we design an IEEE 802.11p-based rear-end collision avoidance application following a fail-safe objective. We focus on two main sources of failure that can deteriorate application's fail-safety: unpredictable driver behavior and an unreliable wireless communication. Thus, we focus on application's logic and leave aspects related to fail-safety features that deal with, e.g., hardware failure or external effects, out of the scope of this paper. To counteract the aforementioned sources of failure the designed application's logic assumes worst case situation change during the packet inter-reception time and automatic braking in case the driver fails to adequately react to the warning. Designed application either imposes large inter-vehicle distances to ensure that all drivers have enough time to react or application takes over the vehicle control to allow smaller inter-vehicle distances and thus higher traffic efficiency. We analyze this tradeoff and quantify what part of driver's population has to be deprived of vehicle control in order to achieve acceptable traffic efficiency. We compare the resulting traffic densities to the highway level of services [1] and with Germany's road traffic regulations. We further evaluate the feasibility of IEEE 802.11p communication to support the fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application under resulting traffic densities, in particular, we look at the resulting channel load.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the related work on existing rear-end collision avoidance applications. In Section III we first outline made assumptions and then the design of a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application. In Section IV we evaluate resulting traffic efficiency and evaluate the corresponding IEEE 802.11p communication channel load. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The ISO 15623 standard [5] describes a radar-based system which main function is to warn the driver if his approach to the leading vehicle becoming a potential hazard. The standard describes general guidelines, like operational limits, warning types and triggering conditions for warnings, as well as no warning conditions. Responsibility for the safe operation of the vehicle remains with the driver.
Many automotive manufactures develop their own collision avoidance algorithms that assess the crash threat based on vehicle motion, human behavior characteristics and information from in-vehicle sensors, like radar, lidar or cameras. In addition to in-vehicle sensor sensitivity to weather conditions [6] and interference [11] some of these algorithms show the necessity for further refinement to better classify threatening and safe situations [10] .
The communication-based Forward Collision Warning (FCW) application of [4] aims to avoid rear-end collisions and follows the general description of [5] but foresees automatic control of application over the vehicle. Application is "active" between two vehicles that are driving one after the other in the same direction and on the same lane. The FCW application of the following vehicle (FV) warns its driver in case the approach to the leading vehicle (LV) is too fast, i.e., the rear-end collision is impending if no braking is applied. In case the driver does not respond to a warning, the system brakes automatically in order to avoid a collision. FCW application calculates two distances -warning distance D W and automatic braking distance D AB , where application either warns its driver or brakes automatically. These distances mark the change of application state, between "no warn", "warn" and "brake". The goal of [4] was to identify application requirements on communication, i.e., where and when does FCW application need to receive new update messages in order to correctly warn its driver or brake. This FCW application does not aim for neither fail-safety nor traffic efficiency, it has not been addressed how to decide when to warn the driver or what application should do in case of information uncertainty. In the following application design we pursue a fail-safety objective and preserve the terminology used in [4] .
III. APPLICATION DESIGN

A. Assumptions and Challenges
The system under investigation assumes that every vehicle possesses its current status information such as information on its ID, speed, direction, position, acceleration, and so on. This information comes either from in-vehicle sensors or over satellite navigation system and is assumed to be error-free. The mechanisms processing this information or improving the accuracy are not the focus of this paper. Every vehicle has a radio transceiver and periodically broadcasts update messages with own status information. Upon reception of periodic messages vehicles are establishing a neighborhood awareness picture. Rear-end collision avoidance application requires reception of at least one message from a vehicle in front and in the same lane to be activated. Application, based on the neighborhood awareness and a predefined logic, assists a driver with warnings or takes over vehicle control. In following we focus on the application logic itself and leave hardware requirements or how a warning should be presented to a driver out of the scope of this paper. We assume scenarios with only passenger cars with a typical vehicle length of 5.5m [1] .
Rear-end collision avoidance application is fail-safe if it incorporates safety features to counteract possible sources of failure. Two main challenges, or sources of failure exist:
• an unpredictable driver behavior
• an unreliable communication
Although rear-end collision application assumes an obedient driver who responds to a warning by deceleration, his reaction time and braking intensity are unpredictable. These driver behavior characteristics differ for each driver and might even vary from one situation to another. The application logic has to account for that in order to be fail-safe. The application also needs to possess an up-to-date awareness picture in order to decide which action to perform. The unreliability of wireless communication makes it impossible to guarantee a reception of the next message update. Meanwhile the traffic situation can change drastically during the packet inter-reception time (IRT) 2 . Application needs to account for packet IRT and be able to deal with unreliable reception of future packets.
Aforementioned assumptions and challenges are considered and addressed in the following design of a fail-safe rearend collision avoidance application.
B. Fail-safe Rear-End Collision Avoidance Application
An unpredictable human behavior and unreliable communication introduce possible sources of failure that can hinder fail-safety of a rear-end collision avoidance application; in following we address them separately.
Addressing Unpredictable Human Behavior
Multiple works exist that analyze driver behavior characteristics like reaction time and braking intensity [12] , [14] . Mainly a controlled measurement of a limited driver population for a reaction to a typical rear-end collision warning is performed. The information is available in the form of either mean values for reaction time and braking intensity or presented as a distribution with a mean and a variance. According to [14] driver's reaction time can be modeled with a log-normal distribution with mean = 1.3s and deviation = 0.74s and braking intensity with a truncated Gaussian distribution with mean = −0.6g, deviation = 0.1g, truncated by max = −0.8g and min − 0.3g, where g is a g-force and is equivalent to ≈ 9.8m/s 2 . No correlation between braking intensity and reaction time values is typically assumed. If application gives a warning considering the reaction time and braking intensity of the average driver (mean values), all drivers that are "worse" than the average driver would not be able to react adequately, i.e., application will not be fail-safe. Therefore, application has to either give a warning accounting for the "worst driver" (maximum reaction time and minimum braking intensity) or integrate automatic braking for those drivers that fail to adequately respond to a warning in order to ensure fail-safety. The maximum reaction time and minimum braking intensity theoretically are not limited and can be given only for a limited driver population. The automatic braking does not need to account for driver's reaction time and can use stronger deceleration, up to a maximum physically possible braking intensity and thus, ensure fail-safety.
Addressing Unreliable Communication
One option to ensure fail-safety, in spite of uncertainty introduced during inter-reception time, is to assume worst case situation change that is possible from the moment the last message from the leading vehicle was received. In the case of a rear-end collision avoidance this means assuming maximum physically possible braking of the leading vehicle right after the last message was received. Accounting for such improbable scenario might seem excessive, but as it is possible, it has to be considered to ensure fail-safety.
The worst case situation change assumptions are as follows:
• if lead vehicle is stopped, the worst case assumption is that it is still at stop. No assumption is made that vehicle drives backwards.
• if lead vehicle is moving, the worst case assumption is that lead vehicle started deceleration with maximum physically possible deceleration.
• if lead vehicle is decelerating, the worst case assumption is that lead vehicle's deceleration has changed to a maximum physically possible deceleration.
Resulting Application logic
When referring to a rear-end collision avoidance application or simply an application, we refer to an application running on the FV.
Application's logic is based on the layout presented in [5] and [4] but is refined for fail-safety objective. Figure  1 illustrates a typical rear-end collision application scenario. Active application calculates two distances, a warning distance D W and an automatic braking distance D AB . These distances separate three possible states of the application: "no warn", "warn" and "brake" states. Application presents a warning to a driver of a following vehicle (FV) if he is approaching a leading vehicle (LV) too fast, in other words, once inter-vehicle distance (IVD) between two vehicles is equal to or less than a warning distance. The warning distance is calculated in a way that allows the driver of the FV to react by deceleration and come to the same speed as the LV at latest safety distance D S away from the LV. If the driver fails to adequately respond to a warning and the IVD decreases further below the automatic braking distance: automatic braking is started. Automatic braking distance is calculated such that it is sufficient to bring the FV to the same speed as the LV with some desired braking intensity, at latest some safety distance D S away from the LV. The matching flowchart of the rear-end collision avoidance application is shown in Figure 2 . Based on the input of own information and information received from the LV application determines inter-vehicle distance and performs calculation of warning and automatic braking distances. During the packet inter-reception time application estimates the speed and position of the LV with a worst case assumption. Depending on D W and D AB , as well as on the current inter-vehicle distance corresponding application's state is set. Such calculation happens in a periodic manner, but can also be triggered upon reception of a new packet from the LV.
The presented application logic, although shown for twovehicle case, is also fail-safe for three-and more vehicle cases. Since application assumes the worst case situation change, i.e., the maximum physically possible deceleration of the leading vehicle, it does not matter whether the leading vehicle brakes on its own or because of a vehicle in front of him.
C. Efficiency Tradeoff
Adjusting the warning to consider the "average driver" with average reaction time and average braking intensity requires automatic braking for all the drivers that are "worse" than average. The warning that accounts for "a worst driver" results in large inter-vehicle distances, but excludes automatic braking. The automatic braking does ensure fail-safety, but takes away vehicle control from drivers. A warning that accounts for "a best driver" will be more efficient with respect to traffic efficiency, but will require automatic braking for most of the drivers. On one side application can leave vehicle control to the drivers and would never have to automatically brake, but have to deal with highly inefficient traffic. On the other side, application can be highly efficient with respect to the traffic, and be a fully automated system with no control left for the drivers. Both systems are fail-safe.
D. Pre-crash Scenarios
Rear-end crashes account for 32.9% of all accidents according to [2] . Following we describe the most frequent pre-crash scenarios that result in a rear-end collision in order to evaluate our application. These are: lead vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle decelerating (LVD) and lead vehicle moving (LVM) scenarios [6] .
Lead Vehicle Stopped
According to [6] 61% of all rear-end crashes involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehicle stopped scenario. The relative speed in LVS scenario can be small, e.g., 50km/h, representing urban scenario where FV is approaching the LV that is stopped at intersection. The relative speed can also be large, e.g., larger than 100km/h, representing highway scenarios, where FV is approaching a traffic jam or a broken vehicle. The warning distance is calculated as follows:
where v F and v L are speed of FV and LV respectively
, t R is a reaction time of FV's driver and a F his braking intensity, t sys is a system delay and D S is a desired safety gap at which FV wishes to come to the same speed as LV. In our study we set t sys = 0 and D S = 1m. An automatic braking distance D AB is calculated similarly to Equation 1, with t R = 0 and a F as a braking intensity used by application, we set a F to maximum physically possible deceleration of −0.8g, other values can be used for smoother automatic braking.
Lead Vehicle Decelerating
According to [6] 25% of all rear-end crashes involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehicle decelerating scenario. If a LV is decelerating the warning distance is calculated as follows:
where
We use t sys = 0 and D S = 1m. Automatic braking distance calculation follows the Equation 2 with t R = 0 and a F set to maximum physically possible deceleration of −0.8g.
Lead Vehicle Moving
According to [6] 13% of all rear-end crashes involving light vehicles were preceded by a lead vehicle moving scenario for which calculation of a warning distance is performed as in Equation 1 , where speed of FV is larger than speed of LV and 
IV. EVALUATION
As stated in section III-B application assumes maximum physically possible deceleration of the leading vehicle, to account for the worst case traffic situation change during the packet inter-reception time. The larger the IRT is the larger the assumed relative speed between LV and FV becomes and thus, the warning and automatic braking distances increase. Every time the FV receives a new packet, the calculation of D W and D AB is updated with the actual values for LV's speed and acceleration. If the warning is given when the time elapsed from the last packet reception is not zero, the warning might be perceived as a nuisance alert, especially if the LV did not actually decelerate or even accelerated after the last packet reception. Figure 3 exemplary shows the development of the warning and braking distances calculated for the average driver (mean reaction time t r = 1.3s and mean braking intensity a F V = -0.6g) over time. The IRT is assumed to be 0.2s, hence, packets are received at t = 0s, 0.2s, 0.4s, and so on. Figure 3a depicts the scenario where the LV is moving with constant speed of v L = 100km/h, FV's speed is v F = 130km/h. At every time sample, here every 0.05s, application performs warning and automatic braking distance calculations. The large increase in D W or D AB at times right after a packet is received, e.g., at t = 0.05s, 0.25s, 0.45s etc. is due to the difference in moving leading vehicle at [14] .
time when a packet is just received and assumed maximum deceleration of the leading vehicle during the time periods in which no new packets are received. Thus, the larger the IRT is the larger is the possibility for application to give a nuisance warning. Naturally, if application assumes "best driver" the difference between assumed worst case and actual distances is smallest, whereas difference is at it largest when "worst driver" is assumed. E.g., if the FV crosses the assumed worst case warning distance at t = 0.1s, the warning given by application is almost 100m too early (if LV's acceleration stays the same). In this case the use of a radar technology would be beneficial to minimize nuisance alert rates, especially, when the FV is close to the warning or automatic braking distances. Although even high reception rates (larger than 50Hz) do not eliminate the difference between assumed and actual distances completely, when aiming for a fail-safe operation. Figure 3b illustrates the same results for a lead vehicle decelerating scenario. The original speed of LV is v L = 100km/h, LV's deceleration is a LV = −0.6g and FV's speed is v F = 130km/h. The difference between assumed worst case and actual case (assuming acceleration stays the same) is less prominent and almost negligible for D AB when compared to the LVM scenario. The small difference is due to the changing value of a LV parameter in Equation 2. When new packet is just received application uses the value reported by the LV (in this case a LV = −0.6g), in between packet receptions worst case is assumed a LV = −0.8g. Thus, the stronger original deceleration of the LV is, the smaller is the area where FV could make nuisance alerts.
A. Methodology
We provide an analytical study for the evaluation of traffic and communication performance based on kinematic laws and an empirical model [9] . We believe that a more realistic simulation model would not provide more insights for the indicators of our study. However, a more realistic model would be required in case of an evaluation of traffic flow smoothness, e.g. when looking at adaptive cruise control applications.
In the following we calculate the maximum warning and automatic braking distances that result due to various IRTs, instead of showing the evolution of D W and D AB over time as in Figure 3 . For our evaluation we investigated inter-reception time values of 0.1s, 0.2s, 1s and 2s, and also provide results for IRT = 0s as a comparison to the best case.
The application can adjust when to give a warning and when to automatically brake. This influences the amount of drivers that have to give up vehicle control to application or can react to a warning. This has a direct impact on traffic efficiency, in particular, the traffic density which is expressed as vehicles per kilometer per lane. In order to quantify this tradeoff we first, generate "driver profiles" with reaction time and braking intensity given in [14] . Figure 4 shows the distribution of reaction time and distribution of braking intensity. We generated 500 samples with each distribution, thus each "driver profile" or simply a driver represents a combination from one sample out of reaction time distribution and one sample out of braking intensity distribution, totaling of 250000 drivers.
For each pre-crash scenario (LVS, LVM, and LVD) and for each of 250000 drivers, the "individual warning distance" is calculated according to formulas given in section III-D. The "individual warning distances" are the distances which drivers require to react with their reaction time and their braking intensity in order to avoid a rear-end collision. The CDF of these warning distances shows the warning distances that provide enough time for a certain amount of driver population to react. If application gives a warning that allows enough time to react to e.g., 90% of all drivers, then for 10% of all drivers automatic braking is needed. The automation level refers to the share of drivers that require automatic braking and thus are deprived of a vehicle control. The traffic density calculation is possible in the following way: e.g., if the warning distance that suits 90% of all drivers is at IVD of 194.5m then, accounting average vehicle length of 5.5m, the possible traffic density for a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application is 5veh/km/lane.
We compare the resulting traffic efficiency with Level of Services (LOS) provided by the Highway Capacity Manual [1] and road traffic regulations in Germany. The Level of Services (LOS) characterize the performance of portions of the transportation system, like multi-lane highways. Table I summarizes the LOS for a multi-lane highway with their corresponding maximum vehicle density for a free-flow speed (speed at low vehicle density) of 100km/h. Lower free-flow speeds, 70-90km/h, result in similar traffic density, with slightly higher density for LOS E (up to 28veh/km/ln). These LOS can be used by application as an orientation for the maximum desired traffic density.
In Germany, the road traffic regulations indicate that the minimum inter-vehicle distance should be large enough to ensure enough space to react for a sudden braking of the LV. The penalty for following with a small IVD starts when speed is larger than 80km/h and IVD equals to 1/4 of the speedometer value in meters (for speed of 80km/h, less than 20m). But with the advancement of automated driving, it becomes a reality to ensure fail-safe operation at IVD much smaller than what is required from human drivers.
At last, we evaluate feasibility of the IEEE 802.11p communication to support fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application for the investigated scenarios and resulting traffic densities. In particular, it might be counterproductive to increase automation level in order to accommodate higher vehicle densities, not only due to decrease of LOS, but also due to resulting congestion in the communication channel.
We make use of the empirical model of [9] and the awareness principle described in [3] . The empirical model accounts for radio propagation with Nakagami m = 3, inputs default packet size of 400 bytes, variable parameters like vehicle density, transmission power and rate, and calculates corresponding probability of packet reception. Awareness principle based on this probability of packet reception calculates the awareness distance at which n packets within T window are received with high probability, here 99.99%. We assume that all vehicles communicate with the same transmission rate of 10Hz and the transmission power is varied to "guarantee" the reception at various warning distances. The corresponding channel load that results from communication of vehicles in various traffic densities and at various distances is then calculated. The vehicle density is scaled up to a multi-lane highway with 2-, 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-lanes (a 2-lane highway has one lane in each direction). Please refer to [9] and [3] for more details and limitations.
B. Results
Lead Vehicle Stopped Scenario
If LV is stopped and the worst case assumption between packets reception is that the LV is still at stop, then the duration of packet inter-reception time does not play a role in calculation of D W or D AB . No matter how large it is, failsafe application still assumes the LV is stopped as long as information stating otherwise is not received.
The CDF of individual warning distances for "generated" 250000 drivers is shown in Figure 5a . Just as the distribution of driver reaction time, the distribution of a warning distance has a heavy tail. Majority of the drivers need similar individual warning distance, and part of drivers require a very large warning distance. Naturally, the smaller the speed of the FV is, the smaller the warning distance is. If the FV's speed is 80km/h and application gives a warning at a distance that provides enough time to react to 99% of all drivers then application has to warn at IVD of 143m. 99% of all drivers will manage to come to a stop on their own without colliding with the LV and 1% of the drivers requires an automatic braking in order to avoid the collision. If application supports automation level of 0.99 (enough time to react for 1% of all drivers) then warning can be given at IVD of 47m. The increase of automation level allows higher traffic densities, but also has smaller communication range requirements, since the corresponding warning distance is smaller. If FV's speed is 80km/h, the vehicle density increases from 6.73veh/km/lane to 19.05veh/km/lane when automation level is increased from 0.01 to 0.99, as seen in Figure 5b . Such increase in automation level also changes the LOS of the multi-lane highway from level A to level D or from free-flow to congestion, cf. Table I . The automatic braking, for presented FV's speeds, is started at the IVDs which are larger than the IVDs which are subjected to a penalty. E.g., for v F = 80km/h the IVD of 20m is subjected Although, from the fail-safe perspective, it does not matter how large the IRT is, we evaluate the channel load resulting from IRT of 0.2s to judge on the feasibility of IEEE 802.11p communication to support fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application in LVS scenario. The largest impact on the channel load comes from high vehicle densities resulting from lower FV's speed, e.g., 50km/h. If automation level is 1, the vehicle density is 46.5veh/km/ln which if scaled up to an 8-lane highway results in a channel load of 2.39Mbit/s. This is below 40% of utilization for a 6Mbit/s channel. Even though such vehicle density is feasible from IEEE 802.11p communication perspective, it might not be desirable from highway LOS or driver experience's perspectives. But this also gives an insight on feasibility of IEEE 802.11p communication to support automated driving, where IVD may be much smaller than what human drivers can safely handle. For the other FV's speeds, vehicle density does not exceed 30veh/km/ln, which roughly represents the LOS E according to [1] . If this density is scaled up to an 8-lane highway the channel load does not exceed 1.48Mbit/s (less than 20% of 6Mbit/s channel). The channel load stays relatively constant throughout automation level variation, since larger vehicle density at the same time means smaller transmission power to satisfy smaller warning distances. The scaling up to a 10-lane highway reaches the limits of the empirical model of [9] . The transmission power has to be further increased to satisfy the reception at warning distances for such high vehicle densities, which results in a channel load of above 3Mbit/s and LOS worse than LOS E.
When IRT > 0s the nuisance alerts are possible, i.e., the warning is given although IVD is larger than the D W . If the "average driver" is warned of LVS, but the LV started moving from the moment the last packet was received by the FV (acceleration of LV only during IRT), the warning is ≈ 3m too early, when v F = 100km/h, the IRT = 0.2s and the average acceleration of a starting vehicle is = 0.23g [12] . Considering that the overall warning distance is > 100m the "early warning" might not be perceived as a nuisance alert by the driver.
The IEEE 802.11p communication is feasible to support fail-safe operation of a rear-end collision avoidance application for a presented LVS scenario in a highway with up to 8-lanes with reasonable channel load below 40%. The lower FV's speed e.g., 30km/h results in a higher channel load > 50% due to higher possible vehicle density > 500veh/km on an 8-lane highway, which can represent a traffic jam or an approach to the end of the jam.
Lead Vehicle Moving and Lead Vehicle Decelerating Scenario
We present LVM and LVD scenarios together as their worst case assumption during the IRT is the same. = 0.2s is the same as shown in Figure 3a and the difference between LVD: IRT = 0s and IRT = 0.2s is the same as shown in Figure 3b . As already been stated, the larger IRT values result in the increase of the warning distance in order not to "miss" any dangerous situation change and in the increase of the probability for a nuisance alert. The latter is especially prominent if the LV did not decelerate and FV is close to the warning distance. Higher automation levels also allow to decrease the difference between the actual warning distance and what is assumed by the application. If the packet IRT is 0.2s, then the increase of automation level from 0.01 to 1 allows increase in the vehicle density from 4.12veh/km/ln to 18.69veh/km/ln. The resulting channel load does not exceed 1.49Mbit/s for up to an 8-lane highway. The vehicle density that is possible on a 10-lane highway results in a channel load of around 3Mbit/s for automation level below 0.5. It is not possible to calculate channel load for higher automation level or rather higher vehicle densities, due to limitations of the empirical model [9] and our condition that all vehicles transmit with the same transmission rate of 10Hz. Higher transmission power might be used, but would have a negative impact on the channel load. The derived vehicle densities result in a highway LOS between LOS A and LOS D if packet IRT> 0s. The vehicle density for IRT=0s, although representing unstable operation at breakdown according to [1] shows the idealistic highway capacity, when technology is not a limiting factor. The corresponding automatic braking distances for various IRTs are given in the legend of Figure 6 . For realistic cases of IRT > 0s the automatic braking is started at IVD that is larger than the IVD subjected to penalties.
Smaller speed results in smaller warning distance and thus, higher vehicle density, cf. If IRT is 0.2s, and vehicle density is scaled up to an 8-lane highway, the resulting channel load does not exceed 2.5Mbit/s, which is around 41% utilization of a 6Mbit/s channel. Interestingly, if vehicle density is between 7veh/km/ln and 28veh/km/ln (LOS A to LOS E) and a highway has up to 8-lanes, the channel load is relatively constant throughout various vehicular speeds and automation levels and is equal to approximately 1.4Mbit/s. The calculation of a channel load for a 10-lane highway is not possible due to limitations of the empirical model [9] , but vehicle density resulting from a 10-lane highway most probably leads to an overly congested channel, since vehicles have to transmit with higher transmission power in order to maintain small IRT. Transmission rate can also be decreased resulting in a less stressed channel and application has to deal with larger IRTs.
The IEEE 802.11p communication is feasible to support fail-safe operation of a rear-end collision avoidance application for presented LVM and LVD scenarios in a highway with up to 8-lanes with a reasonable channel load below 41%. The impact of IRTs on vehicle density is decreasing if relative speed is increasing (± 1 veh/km/ln for relative speed of 100km/h).
C. Discussion
We investigated the most frequent pre-crash scenarios to evaluate the maximum traffic densities that are supported by fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application. Designed fail-safe application does not aim to minimize nuisance alerts, resulting in a non-optimal IVDs when obedient driver is assumed. Nevertheless, such IVDs allow reasonable traffic density that can be reflected by highway level of services, up to LOS E. Moreover, by adjusting the automation level application can control the maximum traffic density. The IEEE 802.11p communication can support communication in resulting traffic densities if scaled up to an 8-lane highway with reasonable channel load of around 40%. The possibility for nuisance alerts comes due to a non-zero packet IRT when the difference between actual traffic situation and what application assumes to ensure fail-safety occurs. There are multiple ways to reduce this discrepancy and thus nuisance alert probability. For example, it is safe to assume that the LV will transmit the Decentralized Environmental Notification Message (DENM) in case of emergency braking [6] . Thus, application's logic can assume less intense braking as a worst case traffic situation change assumption. Adaptive transmission rates, especially when IVD is close to D W or D AB , could help reducing the nuisance alert probability as well as hybrid approach of IEEE 802.11p communication together with sensor-based technologies, e.g., a radar. In hybrid approach the weakness of one technology can be supported by the strength of the other, as also has been pointed out in [6] . These techniques may help maintain the warning distance accuracy within ±15% foreseen in the ISO 15623 standard [5] .
V. CONCLUSION
In the current paper we presented a methodology to design a fail-safe rear-end collision avoidance application that is purely based on IEEE 802.11p. As expected, our results state that higher traffic densities can be achieved if control is taken away from the user and delegated to the application. We further quantified this relationship between the level of automation, i.e. the amount of drivers that have to give up vehicle control to the application, and the resulting traffic efficiency. This understanding is essential in order to properly balance this trade-off and to smoothen the transition from semi-to fullyautomated traffic. The resulting traffic densities match to the highway LOS that are seen on today's highways. Moreover, the IEEE 802.11p communication is able to support traffic density on highways with up to 8-lanes while generating acceptable channel loads of around 40%. The designed application logic, although shown on a two-vehicle case example is also fail-safe and traffic efficient for a three-and more vehicle cases.
